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Abstract—In this work, we address the liability issues that may
arise due to unauthorized sharing of personal data. We consider a
scenario in which an individual shares his sequential data (such as
genomic data or location patterns) with several service providers
(SPs). In such a scenario, if his data is shared with other third
parties without his consent, the individual wants to determine the
service provider that is responsible for this unauthorized sharing.
To provide this functionality, we propose a novel optimization-
based watermarking scheme for sharing of sequential data. Thus,
in the case of an unauthorized sharing of sensitive data, the
proposed scheme can find the source of the leakage by checking
the watermark inside the leaked data. In particular, the proposed
schemes guarantees with a high probability that (i) the malicious
SP that receives the data cannot understand the watermarked
data points, (ii) when more than one malicious SPs aggregate their
data, they still cannot determine the watermarked data points,
(iii) even if the unauthorized sharing involves only a portion of
the original data or modified data (to damage the watermark),
the corresponding malicious SP can be kept responsible for the
leakage, and (iv) the added watermark is compliant with the
nature of the corresponding data. That is, if there are inherent
correlations in the data, the added watermark still preserves such
correlations. Watermarking typically means changing certain
parts of the data, and hence it may have negative effects on
data utility. The proposed scheme also minimizes such utility
loss while it provides the aforementioned security guarantees.
Furthermore, we conduct a case study of the proposed scheme
on genomic data and show the security and utility guarantees of
the proposed scheme.
I. INTRODUCTION
Sequential data includes time-series data such as location
patterns, stock market data, speech, or ordered data such as
genomic data. Individuals share different types of sequential
data for several purposes, typically to receive personalized
services from online service providers (SPs). For example,
people share their continuous locations with map applications
to use navigation services. Similarly, to provide location-based
services, many online service providers motivate individuals to
share their whereabouts. Recently, several direct-to-consumer
SPs have emerged to collect individuals’ genomic information
to provide recreational services or to conduct research. The
type of data collected and processed by these SPs may reveal
significant privacy sensitive information about individuals.
Location data of an individual may reveal information about
his daily life such as his work and home addresses or his
life style. Genomic data of an individual includes his personal
and health-related data such as his physical characteristics and
predisposition to diseases. Thus, the way these SPs handle the
collected data poses a threat to individuals’ privacy and it is
crucial for individuals to have control on how their data is
handled by the SPs.
As an individual shares his personal data with an SP for
a particular purpose, he wants to make sure that his data will
not be observed by other third parties. Privacy leakage occurs
when personal data of individuals is further shared by an SP
with other third parties (e.g., for financial benefit). To deter the
SPs from such unauthorized sharing, it is required to develop
technical solutions that would keep them liable for such
unauthorized sharing (e.g., by connecting the unauthorized
sharing to its source). One well-known tool for such scenarios
is watermarking. An individual may add a unique watermark
into his data before he shares it with each SP, and if his data is
further shared without his authorization, he can associate the
unauthorized sharing to the corresponding SP.
Watermarking is a well-known technique to address the
liability issues for multimedia data [27]. Using the high
amount of redundancy in the data and the fact that human eye
cannot differentiate slight differences between the pixel values,
watermark is inserted into multimedia data by changing some
pixel values. However, watermarking is not a straightforward
technique for sequential data such as location patterns or
genomic data. To insert watermark into sequential data, some
data points should be modified according to the watermark.
In the case of location data, the individual may alter some
of his actual location data as the watermark. In the case of
genomic data, one may change the values of some nucleotides
as the watermark. In both examples, original data is modified to
add the watermark. Thus, watermarking sequential data while
preserving data utility has unique challenges.
Another challenge for watermarking sequential data is
the identifiability of the watermark. An individual cannot
identify the SP that is responsible for the data leakage if the
SP finds the watermark inserted data points locations and
removes the watermarks before the unauthorized sharing.
Thus, as opposed to multimedia data (in which watermark
can be hidden in the redundancy in the data), it is more
challenging to make sure that the SP cannot identify the
watermarked data points in sequential data. An SP may
utilize different types of auxiliary information in order to
determine the watermark in the data. One type of such
auxiliary information may be the inherent correlations in the
data. Location patterns are correlated in both time and space.
Similarly, genomic data carries inherent correlations (referred
as linkage disequilibrium) inside. Thus, an SP can identify
the watermarked data points by identifying the points that
violate the inherent correlations in the data. Another type
of auxiliary information is the data shared by the individual
with other SPs. Multiple SPs may collect the same sequential
data from the same individual (with different watermarks
patterns) and they may compare their collected data in order
to identify the watermark points with higher probability.
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Furthermore, even if the SP partially shares a portion of the
data (rather than sharing the whole data of the individual) or
modify the data (to damage the watermark), it should still be
associated to this unauthorized sharing with a high probability.
Contributions. To address these security and utility chal-
lenges, we propose a novel watermarking-based scheme to
share sequential data. The adoption of watermarking prevents
unauthorized sharing of sequential data by the SPs. In such
a case, the data owner (or a third party) can associate the
source of the leakage to the corresponding SP (or SPs). As
discussed, watermarking is already commonly used to prevent
illegal copies of multimedia data. The main contributions of
the proposed work are summarized as follows:
• We propose a novel collusion-secure watermarking
scheme for sequential data.
• The proposed scheme minimizes the probability for
the identifiability of the watermark by the SPs. We
show that even when multiple SPs join their data
together or they use the knowledge of inherent corre-
lations in the data the watermark cannot be identified
(with a high probability).
• We show that the SPs that are responsible for the
unauthorized sharing can be detected with a high
probability even when they share a portion of the data
or when they modify the data in order to damage the
watermark. We also show relationship between the
probabilistic limits of this detection and the shared
portion of data.
• While providing these security (or robustness) guar-
antees, the proposed system also minimizes the utility
loss in the sequential data due to watermarking.
• We also implement and evaluate the proposed scheme
for genomic data sharing. The main motivations to
choose genomic data sharing as the use case are as
follows: (i) genomic data includes privacy-sensitive
information such as predisposition to diseases [28], (ii)
it is not revokable, and hence it is crucial to make sure
that it is not leaked, and (iii) it has inherent correla-
tions that makes watermarking even more challenging.
We believe that the proposed scheme will deter the SPs
from unauthorized sharing of individual data with third parties.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next
section, we discuss the related work on watermarking and
security and privacy of genomic data. In Section III, we
introduce the data model, the system model, and the threat
model. In Section IV, we provide the details of the proposed
solution. In Section V, we evaluate the security of the proposed
watermarking algorithm. In Section VI, we discuss potential
extensions of the proposed scheme and possible future research
directions. Finally, in Section VII, we conclude the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
Watermarking. Digital watermarking is the act of hiding
a message related to a digital signal (e.g., an image, song,
or video) within the signal itself [18]. It is closely related to
steganography, both of them hide a message inside a digital
signal. The difference between digital watermarking and the
steganography is their goal. Watermarking hides a message
related to the actual content of the digital signal, but in
steganography the message and the actual content of the digital
signal are not related, the digital signal is merely used as a
cover for the message.
Digital watermarks can be used for copy protection and
copy deterrence. Bloom et al. and Maes et al. proposed a
system to protect copyrights on multimedia content in digital
video disk (DVD) [11], [26]. A watermark is inserted into the
content as a counter of copy number. Every time the content
is copied, the watermark can be modified meaning that the
counter is incremented. If the counter reaches a predefined
limit, the hardware would not create further copies of the
multimedia content. Memon and Wong proposed a system that
uses watermark to detect illegal copy of digital content [27].
This system guarantees that the seller of the digital content
cannot share the digital content in an unauthorized way and it
blames the buyer for the illegal copy.
Mainly due to the redundancy in multimedia content,
watermarks are included in multimedia content relatively easier
compared to informative text. Adding or removing a word or a
character to informative text (as the watermark) can be easily
detected by analysing the text. Several works proposed differ-
ent systems to insert watermark into text documents [13]–[15].
Such systems typically include the watermark into the text in
two ways: (i) the first technique is the line-shift algorithm
which moves a line upward or downward (left or right) de-
pending on watermark, and (ii) the second one is the word-shift
algorithm which moves the words horizontally, thus expanding
spaces to embed the watermark. Furthermore, Atallah et al.
proposed a natural language watermarking scheme using the
syntactic structure of the text [5], [6]. Similarly, Topkara et al.
proposed a sentence based text watermark algorithm that relies
on multiple features of each sentence and exploits the notion
of orthogonality between features [31]. These works have
two weakness compared to our proposed scheme. They insert
the watermark to the format of the text (e.g., by expanding
spaces). If one removes the formatting, watermark disappears,
and hence protection of the data is lost. Additionally, none of
these works protect the watermark against collusion attacks.
That is, if two or more different watermarked data are joined
(by different receivers of the same data), watermark inserted
data points can be easily identified.
Boneh and Shaw proposed a general fingerprint
(watermark) solution that is secure against collusion [12].
Their scheme constructs fingerprints in such a way that no
coalition of attackers can find a fingerprint. However, there are
still some practical drawbacks of this scheme. First, the length
of the fingerprint is a problem. The scheme does not consider
the utility loss of the data when it adds fingerprint into the
data. To guarantee security against collusion, fingerprint length
may be very long. Furthermore, this scheme does not consider
the inherent correlations in the data. Sequential data may have
correlations so that attackers may find the fingerprints by
checking the correlated data points. As discussed, we address
these drawbacks in our proposed scheme.
Security and privacy of genomic data. Research on security
and privacy of genomic data has gained significant pace over
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x1, · · · , x` Set of ordered data points
d1, · · · , dm Possible values (states) of a data point
Ii
Index set of the data points that are
shared with the SP i
DIi Set of data points in Ii
WIi Set of data points in Ii after watermarking
ZIi Set of watermarked data points in WIi
TABLE I. FREQUENTLY USED SYMBOLS AND NOTATIONS.
the last few years. Several attacks have been proposed showing
vulnerability of genomic data. Notably, it has been shown that
standard anonymization techniques are ineffective on genomic
data [20], [21]. Also, Humbert et al. evaluated the kin genomic
privacy of an individual threatened by his relatives [23].
As a response to these attacks, several protection mech-
anisms have also been proposed. Many researchers proposed
cryptographic solutions to process genomic data in a privacy-
preserving way [10], [17], [32]. Baldi et al. and Ayday et al.
proposed techniques for the privacy-preserving use of genomic
data in clinical settings [7], [9]. Furthermore, Karvelas et al.
proposed using the oblivious RAM mechanisms to access
genomic data [25]. Huang et al. proposed an information-
theoretical technique for secure storage of genomic data [22].
Recently, Wang et al. proposed private edit distance protocols
to find similar patients (across several hospitals) [33].
Using genomic data in a privacy-preserving way for re-
search purposes has been also an important research topic.
For this purpose, Johnson and Shmatikov proposed the use
of differential privacy concept. Other works also proposed
the use of homomorphic encryption and secure hardware for
the same purpose [16], [24]. In this work, different from all
previous work on genomic security and privacy, we propose
a novel watermarking technique that addresses the liability
issues on sequential data (including genomic data) in case of
unauthorized sharing.
III. PROBLEM DEFINITION
Here, we describe the data model, system model, and
the threat model. Frequently used symbols and notations are
presented in Table I.
A. Data Model
Sequential data consists of ordered data points x1, ..., x`,
where ` is the length of the data. The value of a data point xi
can be in different states from the set {d1, · · · , dm} according
to the type of the data. For instance, xi can be coordinate pairs
in terms of latitude and longitude for location data, it can be
location semantics (e.g., cafe or restaurant) for check-in data,
or it can be the value of a nucleotide or point mutation for
genomic data.
We approach the problem for two general sequential data
types: (i) sequential data with no correlations in which data
points are independent and identically distributed. In this type,
value of a data point cannot be predicted using the values of
other data points. Sparse check-in data might be a good ex-
ample for this type. And, (ii) sequential data with correlations
between the data points. This correlation between data points
may vary based on the type of data. For example, consecutive
data points that are collected with small differences in time
may be correlated in location patterns. That is, an individual’s
location at time t can be estimated if his locations at time
(t − 1) and/or (t + 1) are known. In genomic data, point
mutations (e.g., single nucleotide polymorphisms or SNPs1)
may have pairwise correlations between each other. Such pair-
wise correlations are referred as linkage disequilibrium [30]
and they are not necessarily between consecutive data points.
The correlation value may differ based on the state of each
data point and correlation between the data points is typically
asymmetric. Furthermore, it has been shown that correlations
in human genome can also be of higher order [29]. For the
clarity of the presentation, we first build our solution for
uncorrelated sequential data and then extend it for correlated
data.
B. System Model
We consider a system between a data owner (Alice) and
multiple service providers (SPs) as shown in Figure 1. For
genomic data, the SP can be a medical institution, a genetic
researcher, or direct-to-customer service provider. For location
data, the SP can be any location-based service provider. In
the description of the scheme, for clarity, we give illustrative
examples on binary data but the proposed scheme can be
extended for non-binary data. In fact, for the evaluation of the
proposed scheme, we focus on the point mutations in genomic
data that may have values from {0, 1, 2}. Alice shares parts
of her data with the SPs to receive different types of services.
Note that the part Alice shares with each SP may be different
and we do not need same data to be shared with each SP.
When we talk about the collusion attack (as will be detailed
in the next section), we consider the intersection of the data
parts owned by all malicious SPs.
.
.
.
Alice
Service Provider 1 (SP1)
Service Provider 2 (SP2)
Service Provider h (SPh)
I1
WI
I2
WI
Ih
WI
. . . . . .   1       0       0 . . . . 
. . . . . . 0       0       1 . . . . 
. . . . . .   0       0       1 . . . . . .
Collusion attack
(malicious SPs compare
their data)
Correlation
attack
(malicious SP uses the
correlations in the data)
1
2
h
Fig. 1. Overview of the system and threat models.
On one hand, when Alice shares her data with an SP, she
wants to make sure that her data will not be shared with
other third parties by the corresponding SP. In the case of
further unauthorized sharing, she wants to know the SP that is
responsible from this leak. Therefore, whenever Alice shares
her data with a different SP, she inserts a unique watermark
into it. On the other hand, an SP may share Alice’s data with
third parties without the consent of Alice. While doing so, to
1We provide a brief background on genomics in Section V.
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avoid being detected, the SP wants to detect and remove the
watermark from the data. Instead of sharing the whole data
with a third party, an SP may also share a certain portion of
Alice’s data to reduce the risk of detection (but compromising
from the shared data amount). Similarly, malicious SP (or
SPs) may try to damage the watermark by modifying the
data. Furthermore, two or more SPs may join their data to
detect the watermarked points. Security of the watermarking
scheme increases (against the attacks discussed in the next
section) as the length of the watermark increases. However, a
long watermark causes significant modification on the original
data, and hence decreases the utility of the shared data. In our
proposed scheme, utility loss in the data is minimized while
the watermarking scheme is still robust against the potential
attacks with high probability.
C. Threat Model
Here, we discuss the attacks we consider against the pro-
posed watermarking scheme and our definitions for watermark
robustness under these attacks.
1) Attack models: We consider the following attacks
against the proposed watermarking scheme:2
Single SP attack on uncorrelated data: If the SP wants to
leak Alice’s data, the SP should find and remove the water-
marks from the data so that Alice cannot blame the SP for this
leak. Assume that Alice shares her (uncorrelated) sequential
data of length ` with the SP and she includes a watermark
of length w into this data. Since data is uncorrelated, each
data point is independent from other, and hence for each data
point, the probability of being watermarked is w/`. We also
assume that the SP does not know any auxiliary information
about the data owner. Therefore, it cannot find the watermark
inserted data points with a higher probability. Alternatively,
instead of trying to detect the watermark, the malicious SP
may also modify the data in order to damage the watermark.
Correlation attack: If an SP has correlated data points and
it also knows the corresponding correlation values, is may
identify the watermarked points with higher probability. To be
general, we assume pairwise, asymmetric correlations between
different states of data points. The proposed scheme can be
extended to other scenarios (e.g., higher order correlations or
symmetric correlations) similarly.
As discussed, a data point may take values from the set
{d1, d2, ..., dm}. If dα state of xi (i.e., xi = dα) is correlated
with dβ state of xj (i.e., xj = dβ), then Pr(xi = dα|xj = dβ)
is high, but the opposite does not need to hold (i.e., Pr(xj =
dβ |xi = dα) does not need to be high). Note that dα state
xi may be in pairwise correlation with other data points as
well. We consider all possible pairwise correlations between
different states of all data points in our analysis.
Following the above example, assume the SP has one of
the correlated data points as xj = dβ , but xi = dγ (where
dγ 6= dα). Then, the SP can conclude that xi is watermarked
with probability p(xwi ) = Pr(xi = dα|xj = dβ). If dα state
of xi is also correlated with other data points (that the SP can
observe), then the SP computes the watermark probability on
2We assume there is secure communication between Alice and the SPs.
Therefore, an outsider attacker can neither eavesdrop nor modify the data.
xi as the maximum of these probabilities. Similarly, dγ state of
xi may also be correlated with other data points that the SP can
observe. Since, xi = dγ , such correlations imply that data point
xi is not watermarked. Using such correlations, the SP also
computes the probability that xi is not watermarked, p(xni ).
Eventually, the SP computes the probability of data point
xi being watermarked as (p(xwi ) − p(xni )) (if the computed
value is negative, we make it zero). We further explain this
correlation model in Section IV-B2.
Once the SP determines the probability of being wa-
termarked for each data point, it sorts them based on the
computed probabilities, and identifies the watermarked data
points as the ones with the highest probabilities. We assume
that the SP knows the watermarking algorithm, and hence the
length of the watermark (w). Thus, the SP may chose w data
points corresponding to the w highest probabilities to infer the
watermarked data points in the shared data. Note that there
may be less that w data points with positive probabilities.
In such cases, the malicious SP (or SPs) infer the remaining
watermarked points using either the single SP or collusion
attack.
Collusion attack: Multiple SPs that receive the same data
portion (from the same data owner) with different watermark
patterns may join their data to identify the watermarked points
with higher probability. In such a scenario, when the SPs
vertically align their data points, they will observe some data
points with different states. Such data points will definitely be
marked as watermarked data points by the SPs (with different
probabilities, as will be discussed later), and hence they will
have more chance to identify the watermarked positions. Note
that collusion attack may also benefit from the correlation
attack and each SP may first run the correlation attack on their
data before they join the data for the collusion attack. We also
evaluate the security of the proposed scheme against such an
attack. Similar to the single SP attack, malicious SPs may also
try to modify the data in order to damage the watermark.
2) Watermark robustness: “Robustness” and “security”
terms have been used interchangeably for watermarking
schemes in different works. Adelsbach et al. provide formal
definitions for watermark robustness [3]. Different from our
work, in [3], authors consider watermarking mechanisms that
use a secret embedding key (that is used when adding wa-
termark to the data). Thus, Adelsbach et al. mainly consider
computational robustness that relies on the computational
hardness of a problem. They define watermark robustness
as the information of the watermark that is revealed to the
adversary and watermark security as the information revealed
about the secret embedding key.
They consider two adversary models (passive and active)
and define watermark robustness for both. Robustness for pas-
sive adversary requires watermark to remain detectable when
data is maliciously modified as long as the watermarked data is
perceptibly similar to the original data. This similarity metric is
defined differently for each different application and we use the
data utility value to measure the difference (similarity) between
the watermarked and original data. This definition is similar to
our robustness requirement, however in [3], the authors do not
consider collusion and correlation attacks for the watermark
robustness. Robustness for active adversary, on the other hand,
considers an adversary having access to embedder and detector
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including the corresponding keys. Inspired from [3], we come
up with the following robustness definitions for the proposed
watermarking scheme.
Robustness against watermark inference: This property
states that watermark should not be inferred by the mali-
cious SP (or SPs) via the aforementioned attack models. In
the proposed scheme, inferring the watermark does not rely
on a computationally hard problem; malicious SP (or SPs)
probabilistically infer the watermark. Thus, we evaluate the
proposed scheme for this property in terms of malicious SP’s
(or SP’) inference probability for the added watermark. We
provide the following definition to evaluate the robustness of
a watermarking scheme against watermark inference.
Definition III.1. p-robustness against f -watermark infer-
ence. A watermarking scheme is p-robust against f -watermark
inference if probability of inferring at least f fraction of the
watermark (0 ≤ f ≤ 1, where f = 1 means the whole
watermark pattern) is smaller than p.
Robustness against watermark modification: This property
states that the malicious SP (or SPs) should not be able
to modify the watermark in such a way that the watermark
detection algorithm of the data owner misclassifies the source
of the unauthorized data leakage. We evaluate the proposed
scheme for this attribute in terms of precision and recall of
the data owner to detect the malicious SP (or SPs) that leak
her data. For this, we define “false positive” as watermark
detection algorithm of the data owner classifying a non-
malicious SP as a malicious one and “false negative” as
watermark detection algorithm of the data owner classifying a
malicious SP as a non-malicious one. We provide the following
definition to evaluate the robustness of a watermarking scheme
against watermark modification.
Definition III.2. ρ/-robustness against watermark mod-
ification. A watermarking scheme is ρ/-robust against wa-
termark modification if malicious SP (or SPs), by modifying
the watermark, cannot decrease the precision and recall of the
watermark detection algorithm below ρ and , respectively.
For all the aforementioned attack models, we evaluate the
proposed watermarking scheme based on its robustness. In
Section V, we show the limits of the proposed scheme for
these definitions considering different variables.
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTION
Here, first we present an overview of the proposed protocol
and then describe the details of the proposed watermarking
algorithm.
A. Protocol Overview
When Alice wants to share her data with an SP i, they
engage in the following protocol. The highlevel steps of the
algorithm are also shown in Figure 2.
(1) The SP i sends the indices of Alice’s data it requests,
denoted by Ii.
(2) Alice generates DIi =
⋃
i∈Ii xi.
(3) Alice finds the data points to be watermarked considering
her previous sharings of her data. This part is done using our
proposed watermarking algorithm as described in detail in the
next section.
(4) Alice inserts watermark into the data points in DIi and
generates the watermarked data WIi .
(5) Alice stores the ID of the SP and ZIi (watermark pattern
for the SP i).
(6) Alice sends WIi to SP i.
Alice Service Provider i (SPi)
(1) Indices of the requested data points (Ii)
(2) Generate DIi based on data requested by SP i
(3) Find the data points to be watermarked in DIi according to the 
previous sharings and as a result of the optimization problem
(4) Insert watermark into DIi to generate WIi
(5) Store the ID of SP i and the corresponding ZIi pattern
(6) Watermarked data points WIi
Fig. 2. Data sharing protocol between Alice and a service provider
B. Watermarking Algorithm
In this section, we provide the details of our proposed wa-
termarking algorithm. In particular, we describe the selection
of data points to be watermarked in the sequential data so that
the watermark will be secure against the attacks discussed in
Section III-C.
We insert watermark into a data point by changing this data
point’s state. For instance, if data is binary, this change is from
0 to 1, or vice versa. If each data point can have states from the
set {d1, · · · , dm}, the change is from the current state to some
other predefined state dj . For the simplicity of discussion,
we assume that for each data point, the watermarked state
is predetermined. That is, whenever we decide to watermark
a data point xi, it is always changed to a predetermined state
dj . This assumption can easily be extended to support changes
into various states. In the following, we first detail our solution
for sequential data that has no correlations (data points are
independent from each other) and then, we will describe how
to extend this for correlated sequential data.
1) Sequential data without correlations: Before giving
the details of the proposed algorithm, we first provide the
following notations that will facilitate the discussion.
• nhi : number of data points that are watermarked i times
when the whole data is shared with h SPs.
• yˆhi : number of data points that are watermarked i times
when the whole data is shared h times and will not
be watermarked in the (h+ 1)-th sharing.
• yhi : number of data points that are watermarked i times
when the whole data is shared h times and will be
watermarked in the (h+ 1)-th sharing.
We also provide a toy example in Figure 3 to graphically
represent these notations. In the toy example, Alice has a
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sequential data of length 5 and she has already shared her data
with h = 4 SPs. The example also shows the instance when
Alice shares her data with the (h + 1)-th SP. In a nutshell,
Alice, when she shares her data with the (h + 1)-th SP, runs
the watermarking algorithm to compute the nh+1i values that
would minimize the probability of the attacks discussed in
Section III-C. Based on these values, she determines the data
points to add the watermark.
  x1             x2           x3        x4        x5 
n0
4  =  1 n3
4  =  1 n1
4  =  1 n2
4  =  2 
y0
4 = 1  y2
4 = 1  ŷ1
4 = ŷ2
4 = ŷ3
4 = 1 
(a) 
  x1             x2           x3        x4        x5 
* Watermarked data point 
   *     Original data point                    
(b) 
Data has been shared  
with 4 SPs 
Sharing of data with  
the 5th SP 
Fig. 3. Toy example for the notations in the watermark insertion algorithm.
The proposed algorithm is an iterative one. When Alice
shares her data with a new SP, watermark locations in the
data are determined for the new request according to the
watermark patterns in previously shared data and then, the
data points in the corresponding locations are modified. As
discussed in Section III-C, a malicious SP may try to find the
watermark inserted data points. A malicious SP needs auxiliary
information about the data to increase its probability to find
the watermark inserted data points. This information can be
obtained from other SPs that received the same data from Alice
with different watermark patterns. An example of the collusion
attack may be described as follows.
For simplicity, assume that each data point can be either
0 or 1 and h malicious SPs have the same data portion
(belonging to Alice) with different watermark patterns as
shown in Figure 4. They vertically align their data portions,
compare their data, and find the differences. For a data point
xi, they observe k 0s and (h− k) 1s (where 0 ≤ k ≤ h) and
they conclude that the corresponding data point has either k
or h− k watermarks.
We assume that the proposed watermarking algorithm is
also known by the malicious SPs. Therefore, these h SPs
may run our proposed algorithm (as discussed next) and find
nhk and n
h
h−k values. Once they have these values, they may
compute that (i) the corresponding data point has k watermarks
with probability n
h
k
nhk+n
h
h−k
, and (ii) (h − k) watermarks with
probability n
h
h−k
nhk+n
h
h−k
. To their advantage, malicious SPs start
inferring the watermark positions with higher probabilities
during the attack.
. . . . . . xi-1 xi xi+1 . . . . 
Real Data: . . . . . .   0       1       0 . . . . . .
1st Shared Data: . . . . . .   1       0       0 . . . . . .
2nd Shared Data: . . . . . .   0       0       1 . . . . . .
...
kth Shared Data: . . . . . .   0       0       1 . . . . . .
(k+1)th Shared Data: . . . . . .   1       1       1 . . . . . .
(k+2)th Shared Data: . . . . . .   0       1       0 . . . . . .
...
hth Shared Data: . . . . . .   1       1       0 . . . . . .
xi is 0 k times
xi is 1 (h – k) times
Fig. 4. Collusion attack in which h malicious SPs compare their data
(belonging to the same individual). i-th data point (xi) is 0 k times and
1 (h− k) times.
Multiplication of such probabilities for every data point
gives the probability of identifying the whole watermark
inserted data points. To consider the worst-case scenario,
we assume that malicious SPs have access to all previously
shared data by Alice (i.e., all SPs that receive Alice’s data
collude) and all malicious SPs have the same data portion
belonging to Alice (with different watermark patterns).3 In
our algorithm, watermarks are inserted into the watermark
locations that minimizes the probability of identifying the
whole watermarked points in the data. To do so, we solve a
non-linear optimization problem to determine the data points
to be watermarked at each data sharing instance of Alice. This
problem can be formalized for the (h+1)-th sharing as follows:
min
h+1∏
i=0
(
nh+1i
nh+1i + n
h+1
h−i+1
)n
h+1
i
s.t
(i)
h+1∑
i=0
yhi = watermark length (w)
(ii) nh+10 = yˆ
h
0
(iii) nh+1h+1 = y
h
h
(iv) nh+1i = y
h
i−1 + yˆ
h
i for i = 1, ..., h
(v) yˆhi + y
h
i = n
h
i
(vi) yhi , yˆ
h
i > 0 for i = 0, ..., h
(vii) yh0 > 0
Here, constraint (i) determines the number of data points
that we watermark. That is, the algorithm does not modify
more data points than the limit defined in this constraint. Thus,
for the tradeoff between the security of the watermark and data
utility, the most important parts of the optimization problem
are the objective function and constraint (i). Constraints (ii),
(iii), (iv), and (v) denote the relationship between nhi , n
h+1
i ,
yhi , and yˆ
h
i . In Figure 5, we show this relationship. Constraint
(vi) is used to prevent negative yhi and yˆ
h
i values. Finally,
constraint (vii) is to make sure that each SP has a unique
3If malicious SPs have different data portions, they use the intersection of
these portions for the collusion attack.
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watermark pattern. As the solution of this optimization prob-
lem, we obtain the yhi and yˆ
h
i values. Since in this scenario
the data points are uncorrelated, we may choose any of the nhi
data points to insert the watermark. Note that yhi ≤ nhi , and
thus we will always have enough number of i-times watermark
inserted data points among the previous (h) sharings of the data
to insert watermark for the current ((h+ 1)-th) sharing.
n0
h
 n1
h
 
nh
h
 
.  .  .  .   
n0
h+1
 n1
h+1
 n2
h+1
 nh
h+1
 nh+1
h+1
 
.  .  .  .   
Fig. 5. Relationship between nhi , n
h+1
i , y
h
i , and yˆ
h
i values in the watermark
insertion scheme.
Malicious SPs with partial knowledge. In the above ex-
ample, to illustrate the worst case scenario, we assume that
h malicious SPs correctly know that Alice shared her data
totally h times. However, this assumption may be too strong
in practice. In practice, if h malicious SPs join their data
(belonging to the same individual), they just know that the data
has been previously shared for at least h times. To run their
collusion attack, they should make an assumption about the
total number of times Alice shared the same data before. For
instance, if they assume that data has been previously shared
(by Alice) for h+ t times, there will be t unknown data points
for each data position as shown in Figure 6. Assuming data
points take binary states, for each data location, the unknown
t data points contain u 0s and (t− u) 1s, where 0 ≤ u ≤ t.
. . . . . . xi-1 xi xi+1 . . . . 
Real Data: . . . . . .   0       1       0 . . . . . .
1st Shared Data: . . . . . .   1       0       0 . . . . . .
2nd Shared Data: . . . . . .   0       0       1 . . . . . .
...
kth Shared Data: . . . . . .   0       0       1 . . . . . .
(k+1)th Shared Data: . . . . . .   1       1       1 . . . . . .
(k+2)th Shared Data: . . . . . .   0       1       0 . . . . . .
...
hth Shared Data: . . . . . .   1       1       0 . . . . . .
(h+1)th Shared Data: . . . . . .   ?       ?       ? . . . . . .
...
(h+t)th Shared Data: . . . . . .   ?       ?       ? . . . . . .
xi is 0 k times
xi is 1 (h – k) times
xi is unknown
Fig. 6. Collusion attack in which h malicious SPs compare their data
(belonging to same individual). Malicious SPs do not know the value of xi
for t sharings of the data with non-malicious SPs.
In this scenario, for a data location xi that has k observed
0s and (h−k) observed 1s, the colluding SPs follow the below
steps to identify the watermark.
• There are (k+ u) 0s and (h+ t− k− u) 1s. That is,
the corresponding data point is watermarked for either
(k + u) or (h+ t− k − u) times (0 ≤ u ≤ t).
• Colluding SPs run the algorithm in Section IV-B and
find nh+tk+u and n
h+t
h+t−k−u values.
• The unknown t data points contain u 0s and (t − u)
1s with the following probability:
Pu =
nh+tk+u + n
h+t
h+t−k−u∑t
j=0 n
h+t
k+j + n
h+t
h+t−k−j
.
• Given the unknown t data points contain u 0s and
(t−u) 1s, (h+t) data points have (k+u) watermarks
with probability
pk+u =
nh+tk+u
nh+tk+u + n
h+t
h+t−k−u
.
• Similarly, given the unknown t data points contain u
0s and (t−u) 1s, (h+t) data points have (h+t−k−u)
watermarks with probability
ph+t−k−u =
nh+th+t−k−u
nh+tk+u + n
h+t
h+t−k−u
.
• Finally, malicious SPs conclude that these (h + t)
data points have (k + u) watermarks with probability
Pu · pk+u and these data points have (h+ t− k − u)
watermarks with probability Pu · ph+t−k−u.
Using these computed probabilities, the colluding SPs can
probabilistically identify the watermark for each data location.
Note that our proposed watermarking algorithm also minimizes
the probability of this attack. We study this scenario and show
the security of our proposed scheme against this attack in
Section V.
2) Sequential data with correlations: In Section IV-B1,
malicious SPs do not have any auxiliary information about
the data. Sequential data generally consists of data points that
are correlated. As discussed in Section III-C, if the sequential
data has correlations inside, attackers may find the watermark
inserted data points easier (with higher probability). Therefore,
while adding watermark to (correlated) sequential data, we
should also make sure that strong correlations in the data would
not be disturbed.
We insert watermarks into data in such a way that the
correlations inside the sequential data are preserved. Similar
to uncorrelated data, we follow the protocol and solve the
optimization problem given in Section IV-B1. In this scenario,
the main difference is the way we choose the data points to
insert watermark.
By solving the optimization problem in Section IV-B1,
we first obtain the yhi and yˆ
h
i values. Since this time data
is correlated, watermarks should be inserted in such a way
that no malicious SP can understand the watermark inserted
data points by checking the validity of the correlations. To
guarantee this, if a data point xi’s state is changed from dα to
dβ (due to added watermark), the states of other data points
that are correlated with dβ state of xi should be also changed.
Assume data has been shared for h times before. Watermark
insertion algorithm for the (h+1)-th sharing of the data with
SP ψ is described in Algorithms 1 and 2.
From the solution of the optimization problem, we know
the number of data points which are watermarked i times
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Algorithm 1:
Input:
Y={yh0 , · · · , yhh}
DIψ = {x1, · · · , x`}
Output: WIψ
1 for t = 0 to h do
2 Tt = set of data points that are watermarked t times
3 sort Tt based on the presence probabilities
4 for each xj ∈ Tt do
5 d∗j = value that maximizes presence probability
of xj
6 insertWatermark(xj , d∗j )
7 end
8 end
Algorithm 2:
Input:
xj = data point to be watermarked
d∗j = new value of xj
1 Function insertWatermark(xj , d∗j )
2 t = # of times xj is watermarked during previous h
sharings
3 if Y[t] 6= 0 and DIψ [j] 6= dˆj then
4 DIψ [j] = dˆj
5 Y[t] - -
6 C = set of data points correlated with dˆj state
of xj
7 for each xc ∈ C do
8 d∗c = desired value of xc
9 insertWatermark(xc, d∗c )
10 end
11 end
12 end
and will be watermarked in the current sharing (yhi ). Since
a data point could be watermarked between 0 and h times,
we have the solution set of the optimization problem as Y
= {yh0 , yh1 , · · · , yhh}. Data points to be shared with SP ψ
are DIψ = {x1, · · · , x`} and the states of a data point are
from the set {d1, d2, · · · , dm}. To add watermarks into data
points that are watermarked for t times (t = 0, 1, · · · , h) in the
previous h sharings, we find the set of t times watermarked
data points (Tt) and sort them in ascending order according to
their presence probabilities (Algorithm 1, Line 2-3). Presence
probability can be found as follows. Assume dj state of data
point xj is correlated with the set of data points in C =
{xi0 = di0 , · · · , xin = din}. Then, the presence probability
for (xj = dj) is computed as
∏n
t=0 Pr(xj = dj |xit = dit).
Then, starting from the data point with minimum presence
probability (xj) in T0, we determine the state (d∗j ) that
maximizes its presence probability and change the state of xj
accordingly (Algorithm 1, Line 4-7). This way, we choose the
most likely state value for xj according to the whole data. If the
state of xj is already d∗j , we skip this data point and continue
with the next data point with minimum presence probability.
Otherwise, we change the state of xj to d∗j . Since we change a
data point that is watermarked for t times, we also decrement
the value of Y[t] (= yht ) by 1.
4 After the state of xj is changed
to d∗j , we find the data points that are correlated with d
∗
j state
of xj . That is, we construct a set C with data points that satisfy
Pr(xi|xj = d∗j ) > τ and change the states of the data points
in C (Algorithm 2, Line 6). For each data point in C, we find
its “desired state” (i.e., correlated state with d∗j state of xj),
and change it accordingly (Algorithm 2, Line 7-11). During
this process, if we change a data point that is watermarked for
t∗ times, we also decrement the value of Y[t∗] (= yht∗ ) by 1.
We continue this process until we add w watermarks to the
data. For some data, this algorithm may not find w data points
to add watermarks. For example, all data points may be in a
state that maximizes its presence probability, and thus we may
not find any data points to add watermark. In this case, instead
of choosing the state for the highest presence probability, we
choose the one for the second highest presence probability.
In Figure 7, we show this process with a small example.
First, the state of data point xj is changed from dj to d∗j . Then,
data points (xc1 and xc2) which are correlated with d∗j state
of xj are considered. Assume that d∗c1 and d
∗
c2 states of data
points xc1 and xc2 are correlated with d∗j state of xj . Data
point xc2 is already in state d∗c2, thus we do not change its
state. However, data point xc1 is in state dc1, and hence we
change its state to d∗c1. Since we change the state of xc1 from
dc1 to d∗c1, we now need to consider the data points that are
correlated with d∗c1 state of xc1. Assume d
∗
c3 and d
∗
c4 states
of data points xc3 and xc4 are correlated with d∗c1 state of
xc1. Then, the state of xc4 is changed since it does not have
the desired value, but the state of data point xc3 remains the
same. This procedure continues with the data points which are
correlated with d∗c4 state of xc4, until pre-defined watermark
number is reached.
Current value = dc2
*
Desired value = dc2
*
Current value = dj
Desired value = dj
* …
Current value = dc1
Desired value = dc1
*
XjXc2 Xc1
Current value = dc3
*
Desired value = dc3
*
Current value = dc1
Desired value = dc1
* …
Current value = dc4
Desired value = dc4
*
Xc1Xc3 Xc4
not change change
not change change
Fig. 7. Toy example for inserting watermark into correlated data.
In this algorithm, we consider pairwise correlations be-
tween the data points. When correlations between the data
points are more complex (e.g., higher order), we can still use
a similar algorithm to handle them. We assume that malicious
SPs also have the same resources we use in this algorithm to
use the correlations (in order to detect the watermarked points)
and evaluate the scheme accordingly in Section V.
V. EVALUATION
We implemented the proposed watermarking scheme on
genomic data and evaluated its security (robustness) and utility
4Note that if Y[t] = 0, we skip the remaining t times watermarked data
points and repeat the same procedure for the data points in T1.
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guarantees. In this section, we provide the details of the data
model we used in our evaluation and our results.
A. Data Model
For the evaluation, we used single-nucleotide polymor-
phism (SNP) data on the DNA. A SNP is a point variation
on the DNA that occurs when a single nucleotide adenine (A),
thymine (T), cytosine (C), or guanine (G) in the genome differs
between members of a species [2]. For example, two sequenced
DNA fragments from different individuals, AAGCCTA and
AAGCTTA, contain a difference in a single nucleotide (at the
5th position). In this case, we say that there are two alleles:
C and T. Almost all common SNPs have only two alleles, and
everyone inherits one allele of every SNP position from each of
his parents. If an individual receives the same allele from both
parents, he is said to be homozygous for that SNP position. If
however, he inherits a different allele from each parent (one
minor and one major), he is called heterozygous. Depending
on the alleles the individual inherits from his parents, the
state (or value) of a SNP position can be simply represented
as the number of minor alleles it possesses, i.e., 0, 1, or 2.
We obtained SNP data of 99 individuals from 1000 Genomes
Project [1]. In the obtained dataset, each individual has 7690
SNP values meaning that we have a 99 by 7690 matrix and
elements of matrix are either 0, 1, or 2.
B. Results
We evaluated the proposed watermarking scheme in various
aspects. In particular, we evaluated its security (robustness)
against collision and correlation attacks (as discussed in Sec-
tion III-C) and the loss in data utility due to watermark
addition. In all collusion attack scenarios, we assume that Alice
shares the same data portion with the SPs. This assumption
provides the maximum amount of information to the malicious
SPs. If different set of data points are shared with the SPs,
malicious SPs can use the intersection of these data points for
the collusion attack. We also evaluated the proposed scheme
in terms of the (watermark) detection performance of the data
owner under various attacks. We ran all experiments for 1000
times and report the average values.
1) Robustness against watermark inference: Here, we eval-
uate the robustness of the proposed scheme against watermark
inference.
Collusion attack: First, we evaluated the probability of iden-
tifying the whole watermarked points in the collusion attack
(when correlations in data are not considered). We considered
the worst case scenario and assumed that all the SPs that has
Alice’s data are malicious, and hence they exactly know how
many times Alice has shared her data to compute the exact
probabilities for the attack (as discussed in Section IV-B1). In
Figure 8, we show the logarithm of this inference probability
when data is shared with h SPs and they are all malicious
(where h = (1, 2, · · · , 10)) and when different fractions of
data is watermarked. Assuming Alice’s shared data is of length
` and the length of the added watermark is w, we denote the
fraction of watermarked data (or watermark ratio) as r = w/`.
Detailed results of this experiment are also shown in Table II.
Overall, we observed that the probability to completely identify
the watermark via the collusion attack is significantly low
when the proposed technique is used for watermarking the
data. Following our definition of robustness against watermark
inference (in Section III-C2), under this attack model, the
proposed scheme is p-robust against f -watermark inference for
f = 1 and p ≤ 10−2 when h is as high as 10 and data utility is
as high as 97% (i.e., r is as small as 0.025). As expected, we
observed that the inference probability of the malicious SPs
increases with decreasing r and increasing h values. That is,
as data is shared with more malicious SP, the probability to
identify the watermarked data increases due to the collusion
attack. Also note that even for significantly low values of r
(that corresponds to high data utility), the proposed scheme
provides high resiliency against collusion attacks.
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Fig. 8. Probability of identifying the whole watermarked points in the
collusion attack when h malicious SPs collude. r represents the fraction of
watermarked data.
Watermark ratio (r)
Number
of
sharings
(h)
0.025 0.05 0.1
2 -199 -397 -793
4 -84 -166 -338
6 -26 -57 -110
8 -7 -14 -27
10 -2 -5 -8
TABLE II. COMMON LOGARITHM (log10) OF THE INFERENCE
PROBABILITY TO IDENTIFY THE WHOLE WATERMARK FOR VARYING h
(NUMBER OF COLLUDING SPS) AND r (FRACTION OF WATERMARKED
DATA) VALUES.
We also ran the same experiment to observe the proba-
bility of malicious SPs to identify different fractions of the
watermarked positions. In Figure 9, we show this inference
probability. For this experiment, we assume that the malicious
SPs initially try to identify the watermark positions that has
higher probability to be watermarked. Since we assume that
the watermarking algorithm is publicly known by the malicious
SPs, once they observe vertically aligned data points (as in Fig-
ure 4), they can compute the probability of being watermarked
for each data position (as discussed in Section IV-B1) and
initially try to identify high probability watermark positions.
We also set the number of colluding malicious SPs h = 6 and
watermarked different fractions of the whole data (i.e., varied
the r value). We observed that colluding SPs can identify
small portion of watermark locations with small probabilities
9
and this probability rapidly decreases with increasing fraction
of watermarked data (r). Also, the probability to identify
more than 30% of the watermarked locations is significantly
low even when the malicious SPs collude. Notably, we show
that when r = 0.025 (which means 200 watermarked data
points on a data of size 7690, and hence preserves more than
97% of data utility), even when 6 malicious SPs collude,
the probability to recover more than 30% of the watermark
locations is very small. In other words, under this attack model,
when r = 0.025, the proposed scheme is p-robust against f -
watermark inference for f = 0.3 and p ≤ 10−1.
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Fig. 9. Inference probability to identify different fractions of the watermarked
positions in the collusion attack when the number of colluding malicious SPs
h = 6. r represents the fraction of watermarked data.
Next, we considered the case in which the malicious SPs
do not exactly know how many times Alice has shared her
data (i.e., malicious SPs with partial knowledge as discussed
in Section IV-B1). Thus, we evaluated the relation between
the inference probability (to identify the whole watermarked
positions) and the assumption of the malicious SPs on the
number of times data has been shared. As discussed in
Section IV-B1, in practice, h colluding SPs can only know
that data has been previously shared for at least h times and
they make assumptions about the exact number of sharings.
Hence, to compute the probabilities they use for the attack,
they may assume that data has been shared for between h and
(h+ t) times, where (h+ t) is an upper limit.
In Figure 10 we show the logarithm of the inference
probability when data has been actually shared for 6 times
by Alice. In Figure 10(a), we assume different number of
colluding SPs (h) that run the collusion attack as discussed
in Section IV-B1 (as malicious SPs with partial knowledge).
For instance, when h = 3, the malicious SPs run the attack
four times assuming that data has been shared for 3, 4, 5, and
6 times, respectively. For this experiment, we set r = 0.05.
In Figure 10(b), we show the same probability for different
r values for a single malicious SP. We observed that as the
colluding SPs infer more missing data points (even when they
correctly guess the exact number of sharings), their inference
probability decreases. Therefore, it is better for h colluding
SPs to assume that data has been shared for exactly h times,
and run their attack accordingly. However, even in this case,
we show that the inference probability of the malicious SPs is
significantly low.
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(a) Different number of colluding SPs (h) when fraction
of watermarked data r = 0.05.
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(b) Different fractions of watermarked data for a single
malicious SP.
Fig. 10. Probability of identifying the whole watermarked points in the
collusion attack when malicious SPs has partial knowledge about the number
of times data has been shared. Data has been actually shared for 6 times.
Correlation attack: To evaluate the security of the proposed
scheme against the correlations in the data, we compared two
techniques presented in Sections IV-B1 and IV-B2. In this
analysis, we focused on a data length (`) of 100 in our dataset.
We find each pairwise correlation Pr(xi = α|xj = β) between
these 100 data points, where α, β ∈ {0, 1, 2}. To consider
only strong correlations (and to avoid the noise that arise
due to weak correlations), we only consider the ones above
a threshold τ (we selected τ = 0.9). Note that the correlations
in the data are not symmetric. That is, Pr(xi = di|xj = dj)
being high does not mean that Pr(xj = dj |xi = di) is also
high.
First, we compared two schemes for a single SP attack
in terms of the probability of the malicious SP to identify
different fractions of the watermarked positions. Note that in
this attack, the malicious SP also utilizes its knowledge of
correlations in the data.5 In Figure 11(a) and (b) we show this
comparison for different r values. We observed in Figure 11(a)
that as r increases, the inference probability of the malicious
5We assume that knowledge of the malicious SP about the correlations
is the same as the knowledge we utilized while adding the watermark in
Section IV-B2.
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SP increases for the technique presented in Section IV-B1. This
is expected since (i) if correlations are not considered while
selecting the watermarked positions, the probability of the
attacker to identify the watermarked positions also increases,
and (ii) as more data points are watermarked in this way,
the attacker can identify more watermarked position. However,
when we consider the correlations in the data when selecting
the watermark locations, the inference probability of the ma-
licious SP significantly decreases as shown in Figure 11(b).
Also, in this scenario, inference probability decreases with
increasing r value as expected. For instance, when r = 0.3,
the watermarking scheme is p-robust against f -watermark
inference for f = 0.2 and p ' 1 when the correlations in the
data are not considered. When we consider the correlations
in the data using the proposed watermarking algorithm, it
becomes p-robust against f -watermark inference for f = 0.2
and p ' 0.
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
Fraction of watermarked positions
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
In
fe
re
nc
e 
pr
ob
ab
ili
ty
r = 0.1
r = 0.2
r = 0.3
(a) Correlations in the data are not considered when
selecting the data points to be watermarked (i.e., technique
proposed in Section IV-B1 is used for watermarking).
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(b) Correlations in the data are considered using the
proposed algorithm when selecting the data points to be
watermarked (i.e., technique proposed in Section IV-B2 is
used for watermarking).
Fig. 11. Inference probability to identify different fractions of the water-
marked positions in the single SP correlation attack. r represents the fraction
of watermarked data.
Collusion and correlation attack: We also compared two
techniques presented in Sections IV-B1 and IV-B2 to show
the resiliency of the proposed watermarking scheme against
both collusion and correlation attacks at the same time. In
this attack, each malicious SP first runs the correlation attack
independently. As a result of this part, each malicious SP
detects a number of watermarked points. For the advantage of
the malicious SPs (and to consider the worth case scenario),
we consider the outcome of the malicious SP with the highest
number of correct detections. Let the number of watermarks
detected by this malicious SP be m as a result of the first
part.6 Then, to detect the remaining w−m watermarked points,
malicious SPs run the collusion attack.
In Figure 12(a) and (b) we show this comparison for
different r values when the number of colluding malicious SPs
h = 6 (and data has been shared for 6 times). We observed that
when the correlations are not considered in the watermarking
algorithm, malicious SPs can identify more than half of the
watermarked data locations with high probability as shown
in Figure 12(a). However, when we consider the correlations
to select the data points to be watermarked, the inference
probability of the malicious SPs significantly decreases (as in
Figure 12(b)). For instance, when r = 0.3, the watermarking
scheme is p-robust against f -watermark inference for f = 0.5
and p ' 1 when the correlations in the data are not considered.
When we consider the correlations in the data using the
proposed watermarking algorithm, it becomes p-robust against
f -watermark inference for f = 0.5 and p ≤ 0.1. This shows
that the proposed watermarking scheme provides security
guarantees against both collusion and correlation attacks with
high probabilities even when all the SPs that receive the data
are malicious and colluding (as in this experiment). Note that
in Figure 12(b), the reason inference probabilities for r = 0.2
is larger than the ones for r = 0.1 is due to the result of the
optimization problem.
2) Robustness against watermark modification: Here, we
evaluate the robustness of the proposed scheme against water-
mark modification.
Partial sharing: We evaluated the detection performance (and
robustness against watermark modification) of the proposed
watermarking scheme when a malicious SP partially shares
Alice’s data. In this scenario, we assume that Alice has shared
her data (same data portion at each sharing) with h SPs
(SP1, · · · , SPh). The malicious SP, rather than sharing the
whole data with a third party without Alice’s authorization,
shares different fractions of the data to avoid being detected
by Alice. As we have shown in previous experiments, the
probability for a malicious SP to detect the watermarked data
points is significantly low for our proposed scheme (even in
the existence of collusion attack). Thus, we assume that the
malicious SP randomly selects different fractions of data points
to share with the third party. Here, we assume the malicious SP
does not further modify Alice’s data before it shares it with a
third party as such modification would degrade the credibility
of the data (as we discuss in Section VI). We also consider
and extensively study the impact of such modification to the
detection performance later in this section.
We first quantify the detection performance of our proposed
scheme under this scenario by using an entropy metric. That
is, we compute the uncertainty of Alice about the source
of the leaked data. Alice, to detect the source of the leak,
compares the watermark pattern corresponding to each SP she
6As discussed, malicious SPs may detect less than w watermarked points
as a results of the correlation attack.
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(a) Correlations in the data are not considered when
selecting the data points to be watermarked (i.e., technique
proposed in Section IV-B1 is used for watermarking).
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(b) Correlations in the data are considered using the
proposed algorithm when selecting the data points to be
watermarked (i.e., technique proposed in Section IV-B2 is
used for watermarking).
Fig. 12. Inference probability to identify different fractions of the water-
marked positions in collusion attack (when h = 6) in which the malicious SPs
also use the correlations in the data. r represents the fraction of watermarked
data.
has shared her data with the (partial) pattern on the leaked
data. Thus, any SP i whose watermark pattern (ZIi ) includes
the partial watermark is marked as a potential malicious SP
by Alice. Let SPφ be the source of the leak as inferred by
Alice as a result of this comparison. The probability that
the source being SPi is then p(SPφ = SPi). Thus, we
compute the uncertainty of Alice about the source of the leak as
H = −∑hi=1 p(SPφ = SPi) log p(SPφ = SPi). We show the
results of this evaluation in Figures 13(a) and (b) for varying
r and h values, respectively. We conclude that the data owner
can associate the source of the leakage to the corresponding
SP with high probability in most of the cases, except when the
malicious SP shares very small portion of user’s data with a
third party. However, this particular case would also reduce the
benefit of the malicious SP (due to the unauthorized sharing)
significantly. Furthermore, such partial sharing may degrade
the credibility of data as discussed in Section VI.
We also quantify the robustness against watermark modi-
fication under this attack using precision and recall metrics.
Alice constructs a set S that includes the malicious SPs
detected by her. We define true positive as a malicious SP that
is in set S, false positive as a non-malicious SP that is in S,
true negative as a non-malicious SP that is not in S, and false
negative as a malicious SP that is not in S. In Figures 14(a)
and (b), we show the precision and recall values for varying
ratio of shared data by the malicious SP and for different r
and h values. Following our definition of robustness against
watermark modification (in Section III-C2), under this attack
model, the proposed scheme is ρ/-robust against watermark
modification with  = 1 for all considered values of h and r.
Furthermore, when r ≥ 0.2, h ≤ 10, and the ratio of shared
data by the malicious SP is more than 0.2, the proposed scheme
is ρ/-robust against watermark modification with ρ ' 0.97
and  = 1.
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(b) Alice shares her data with h SPs when fraction of
watermarked data r = 0.2.
Fig. 13. Uncertainty of the data owner (Alice) to identify the source of the
data leakage when the malicious SP partially shares Alice’s data.
Watermark modification: Finally, we studied a stronger
attack in which malicious SP (or SPs) modify the data in order
to damage the watermark (and hence, it becomes harder for
the data owner to detect the source of the data leak). Note that
in practice, such modification of data not only reduces data
utility (as we show in our experiments), but it also degrades
data credibility while the malicious SPs share the data with
a third party (as discussed in Section VI). Here, malicious
SPs (or SP) try to remove or damage the watermark by (i)
changing the states of data points that are different when they
aggregate their data (i.e., when they detect a data point with
multiple states in the aggregate data, they change its state to the
majority of the observed states), and (ii) adding noise to other
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(b) Alice shares her data with h SPs when fraction of
watermarked data r = 0.2.
Fig. 14. Precision and recall values for the data owner to detect the malicious
SP when the malicious SP partially shares Alice’s data.
data points (i.e., changing states of other random data points).
Eventually, data leaked by the malicious SPs has a watermark
pattern represented as Zα. Using Zα and unique watermark
patterns of the SPs (that previously received the data), Alice
constructs the set S that includes the malicious SPs detected
by her. As before, we evaluate the success of the detection via
precision and recall metrics. For all following experiments we
set the watermark ratio (r) to 0.05.
First, we consider the single SP attack in which data has
been shared with h SPs and there is a single malicious SP (data
owner Alice may or may not know the number of malicious
SPs). Watermark length (w) is known by the malicious SP and
the malicious SP randomly changes (pi×w) data points in the
data and shares it. For each SP i that received her data, Alice
computes gi = |Zα ∩ZIi | (ZIi is the watermark pattern of SP
i) and identifies the malicious SP as the one with the highest
gi value. In Figure 15(a), we show the precision and recall
when the data owner knows that there is a single malicious SP
and for different pi and h values. We conclude that when the
data owner knows that there is a single malicious SP, both the
precision and recall values are high even when the malicious
SP significantly damages the watermark. Under this attack, the
proposed scheme is ρ/-robust against watermark modification
with ρ =  ' 1 when pi < 13 and h ≤ 20 (pi = 13 means a
utility loss of 65%).
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(a) Data owner knows the number of malicious SPs (φ =
φˆ = 1).
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(b) Data owner predicts the number of malicious SPs as
φˆ when pi = 15 and the actual number of malicious SPs
φ = 1. When h = 5, the maximum value of φˆ is 5 as the
data owner does not expect more than h malicious SPs.
Fig. 15. Precision and recall values for the data owner to detect the malicious
SP in the single SP attack in which data has been shared with h SPs. Malicious
SP randomly changes (pi×w) data points to damage the watermark (w is the
watermark length).
We also considered the case in which the data owner
(Alice) does not know the number of malicious SPs. Here, the
actual number of malicious SPs φ = 1. We also let φˆ denote
the number of predicted malicious SPs by Alice. This time,
Alice predicts the number of malicious SPs as φˆ (φˆ can be any
number from 1 to h). Alice first generates all combinations of
h with φˆ. Then, she eliminates the combinations for which the
union of the watermarked points of the SPs (in that particular
combination) does not contain the watermark pattern in the
leaked data (Zα). Next, for each non-eliminated combination
ci, she computes gi =
∑
j∈ci |Zα∩ZIj |. That is, she computes
the sum of intersections of watermarked data points for each
SP in the corresponding combination ci with Zα. Finally,
she selects the most likely combination with the highest gi
value and concludes that the SP (or SPs) in the corresponding
combination are malicious. In Figure 15(b), we set pi = 15
and show the precision and recall values for different values
of h and φˆ (when φ = 1).7 We observed that when the data
owner predicts the actual number of malicious SPs, the actual
malicious SP is in set S with a high probability regardless of
7For smaller values of pi both precision and recall values are almost equal
to 1.
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the number of sharings of the data owner. Under this attack, the
proposed scheme is ρ/-robust against watermark modification
with  = 1 when pi ≤ 15, h ≤ 20, and φˆ ≤ 15. As expected,
precision (ρ) decreases as the number of predicted malicious
SPs is greater than the actual number of malicious SPs. It is
worth noting that this result is obtained when pi = 15, which
means the malicious SP reduced the utility of the data by 75%
to damage the watermark.
Then, we studied the same scenario for the collusion attack.
We assume data has been shared with h = 10 SPs and the
number of actual colluding SPs is denoted as φ (φ > 1). Here,
malicious SPs compare their aggregated data and only change
the states of data points that are different as discussed before.
First, we assume that φ is known by the data owner (i.e.,
φˆ = φ). As before, the data owner generates the possible
combinations and constructs set S from the most probable
combination. In Figure 16(a), we show the precision and recall
for different φ values. As before, we also considered the case
that the data owner does not know φ and estimates it as φˆ. In
Figure 16(b), we show the precision and recall for different φˆ
and φ values. We observed that when the data owner knows
the number of actual malicious SPs, we obtain high precision
and recall values even when 50% of the SPs that received the
data are malicious and colluding. In other words, under this
scenario, the proposed scheme is ρ/-robust against watermark
modification with  = ρ ' 0.96. When the data owner predicts
the number of malicious SPs, we observed two cases: (i) when
the predicted number of malicious SPs (φˆ) is greater than the
actual number of malicious SPs (φ), the proposed algorithm
always includes the actual malicious SPs to set S with a high
probability. That is, the proposed scheme is ρ/-robust against
watermark modification with  = 1. And, (ii) when φˆ value is
smaller than φ, all the detected malicious SPs in set S are
actual malicious SPs with a very small false positive rate.
That is, the proposed scheme is ρ/-robust against watermark
modification with ρ = 1.
Finally, we considered the case in which colluding ma-
licious SPs also add random noise in addition to changing
the states of data points that are different in the aggregate
data. We assume data has been shared with h = 10 SPs and
colluding malicious SPs randomly change (pi×w) data points
in the data before they leak it. In Figures 17(a) and (b), we
show the precision and recall when φˆ = φ, and when the
data owner does not know φ, respectively. In Figure 17(a),
we also show the percentage of utility loss in the data due
to the noise addition by the malicious SPs (to damage the
watermark). Here, the utility loss is shown when r = 0.05
(i.e., when 5% of original data is watermarked). As r value
increases, the loss in utility (due to extra noise addition by
the malicious SPs) also increases linearly. For instance when
r = 0.1, to decrease the precision and recall values down to
0.2, half of the SPs that received the data should be malicious
and they need to add noise to 50% of the original data to
damage the watermark. As shown in Figure 17(a), if the data
owner knows the number of malicious SPs, both precision and
recall of detection performance are high up to 30% of the SPs
that received the data are malicious (and colluding) and up to
a utility loss of 15%. That is, the proposed scheme is ρ/-
robust against watermark modification with  = ρ ' 0.9 up
to φ = 3 and pi = 3. Beyond this, we observed a decrease
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(b) Data owner predicts the number of malicious SPs as φˆ
when the actual number of malicious SPs is φ.
Fig. 16. Precision and recall values for the data owner to detect the malicious
SPs in the collusion attack in which data has been shared with h = 10 SPs. φ
and φˆ denote the number of actual and predicted malicious SPs, respectively.
Malicious SPs only change the states of data points that are different in the
aggregated data and do not add further noise (pi = 0). In (a), precision and
recall curves for different φ values overlap.
in both precision and recall with increasing pi and φ values.
This behavior gives some idea about the practical limits of
our proposed scheme. When data owner predicts the number
of malicious SPs (Figure 17(b)), we observed two cases: (i)
when the added noise by the malicious SPs is less than 3 times
the watermark length, the proposed scheme includes the actual
malicious SPs in set S with a high probability. That is, the
proposed scheme is ρ/-robust against watermark modification
with ρ ' 0.7 up to pi = 3 and for all φˆ values. When the added
noise by malicious SPs is beyond this value, both precision and
recall values start decreasing. Note however that adding noise
beyond this value significantly reduces data utility as discussed
before.
VI. DISCUSSION
Here, we discuss potential use of our proposed scheme in
real-life, its potential extensions, and future research directions.
Usability. The proposed system detects the malicious SPs if
data is leaked or sold without the data owner’s consent and
if the data owner observes this leakage. Similarly, the SP that
buys the data may keep the malicious SPs liable from this
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(a) Data owner knows the number of malicious SPs (φ =
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(b) Data owner predicts the number of malicious SPs as φˆ
when the actual number of malicious SPs φ = 5 and for
varying pi values.
Fig. 17. Precision and recall values for the data owner to detect the malicious
SPs in the collusion attack in which data has been shared with h = 10 SPs. φ
and φˆ denote the number of actual and predicted malicious SPs, respectively.
Malicious SPs both change the states of data points that are different in the
aggregated data and they randomly change (pi×w) data points to damage the
watermark (w is the watermark length). In (a), precision and recall curves for
different φ values overlap. Also, in (a), we show the percentage of utility loss
due to addition of extra noise by the malicious SPs.
unauthorized sharing (with the cooperation of the data owner).
It may be practically infeasible for a data owner to notice her
data is leaked at the first place. Instead, this can be outsourced
to a third party that continuously analyzes publicly available
datasets that are made available by SPs that collect personal
information.
Attacker’s auxiliary information. Security of the proposed
watermarking scheme also depends on the auxiliary knowl-
edge of the malicious SPs. For example, genomes of family
members are highly correlated with each other. Therefore, if a
malicious SP obtains genomic data from multiple individuals
from the same family, it may have higher probability to
determine the watermarked points by analyzing the expected
correlations across such individuals’ data. In future work,
we will extend our optimization problem by also considering
such correlations across different data owners. Similarly, if the
malicious SP knows phenotypic information about the data
owner, it may connect this information to her genomic data. In
general, auxiliary information about the data owner may help
a malicious SP to infer the watermarked positions with higher
probability. We will also study the impact of background
information a malicious SP may have about an individual to
the security of the proposed watermarking scheme.
Data privacy. Many recent developments in data sharing
services are based on users adding noise to the data they send
to the SPs (e.g., location data is perturbed before it is shared
with a location-based service provider [4]). By integrating the
differential privacy concept [19] to our proposed watermarking
scheme, we can actually both add watermark and use the
watermark as noise to also provide privacy. Traditionally,
differential privacy concept is applied to statistical databases.
Recently, differential privacy concept has been used for indi-
vidual release of location data [4]. As future work, we will
integrate the idea in [4] into our watermarking algorithm.
In this work, we assume that data is shared with the SPs
in a non-anonymous way. On the other hand, if data is shared
by the data owner in an anonymous way (e.g., by removing
the identity and applying perturbation), the SPs first need to
find the connection between data portions they received from
the same data owner. This will create another challenge for
the malicious SPs to perform the collusion attack and we will
analyze this scenario in the future work.
Data utility. We show that in all attacks, utility remains
high (i.e., number of watermarked positions are significantly
less). We obtained this by trying different r values (i.e.,
ratio of the watermark length to the data length). We can
alternatively include w (i.e., watermark length) as one of the
objectives of the optimization problem and put a limit on it.
When we include w in the objective function, the problem
becomes a multi-objective optimization problem. Solution of
a multi-objective optimization problem is non-trivial and many
proposed techniques suggest converting the multi-objective
problem into a single-objective one. Thus, we transform this
multi-objective problem into single objective problem.
In this new formulation, there are two additions to the
optimization problem introduced in Section IV-B1. First, the
objective function is changed as follows:
min{β ·
h+1∏
i=0
(
nh+1i
nh+1i + n
h+1
h−i+1
)n
h+1
i + (1− β) · w}
We use the weighted sum of the watermark length and the
inference probability as the new objective function. The weight
(β) determines the tradeoff between the inference probability
and the watermark length (i.e., data utility). Second, we keep
all 7 constrains the same (as in Section IV-B1) and add a new
constraint as w < wm, where wm is the maximum allowed
watermark length. This new constraint puts a threshold to the
maximum number of watermark points. This new optimization
problem guarantees the minimum weighted sum of inference
probability and watermark length.
Depending on the data type, other utility constraints may
also be included in the proposed algorithm. For instance, if
adding watermark to two consecutive data points significantly
reduces data utility, once yhi and yˆ
h
i values are determined as
a result of the optimization problem, watermark addition algo-
rithm in Section IV-B1 (or Section IV-B2) can be tailored to
take this constraint into account while adding the watermarks.
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Data credibility. Our scheme guarantees that if data is leaked,
the owner of the data will be able to find the source of the
leakage. However, SPs that receive data from an individual
should also be sure that the data is credible. Up to this point,
we do not guarantee the credibility of the data. A malicious
individual may mislead an SP by sending fake data to it. Ayday
et al. proposed a cryptographic system that guarantees data
credibility while sharing genomic data between entities [8].
The system in [8] uses homomorphic signatures and aggregate
signatures and it consists of three parties: (i) data owner
(Alice), (ii) the certified institution (CI), and (iii) the service
provider (SP). The role of the data owner and the SP is the
same with our proposed system. We can apply a simplified
version of the scheme in [8] to also provide data credibility
with the help of a CI. In that scenario, data owner (Alice)
sends her data points to the CI and the CI signs each data point
individually by using a homomorphic signature scheme. Alice,
when she shares her data with an SP, computes a signature on a
linear combination of her shared data using the homomorphic
properties of the signature scheme. Thus, given the data points
it receives from Alice and the public key of the CI, the SP can
verify the credibility of data by verifying the signature.
As future work, we will integrate this solution to our pro-
posed watermarking algorithm to address the data credibility
issue. With this technique, a malicious SP cannot partially
share Alice’s data or malicious SPs cannot modify Alice’s data
to damage the watermark since data credibility will be lost
in both cases. Therefore, attacks presented in Section V-B2
would not be possible as the malicious SPs cannot prove the
credibility of the data once they modify it.
Other applications. The proposed watermarking algorithm
can be applied for any type of sequential data (we describe the
general framework for sequential data in Section IV). However,
implementation for different data types is non-trivial. Water-
marked data point is not always changed to a predetermined
state; there may be many alternatives (e.g., perturbed location
may have many different states that are determined based on
privacy and utility). Furthermore, correlations in other types
of data may be more complex. To address some of these
challenges, we will work on the application of the proposed
scheme for location patterns as future work.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this work, we have proposed a scheme to share se-
quential data while addressing the liability issues in case of
unauthorized sharing. The proposed scheme is between a data
owner and one or more service providers. We have shown
that the proposed watermarking scheme provides high security
against collusion and correlation attacks. That is, with high
probability, malicious service providers cannot identify the
watermark on the data even if they collude or try to use the
inherent correlations in the data. We have also shown that the
proposed scheme does not degrade the utility of data while it
provides the aforementioned security guarantees. We believe
that the proposed work will deter the service providers from
unauthorized sharing of personal data with third parties.
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